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6. Keynes 's View of Economics as a
Moral Science 1
J.B. Davis
J .M. Keynes' s theoretical understanding of economic method is one of
tbe less well understood dimensions of bis thought, both because
Keynes's thinking, unlike that of most economists, was motivated by
serious reftection on philosophical questions, and because Keynes's
particular philosophical beritage- rooted as it was in early reftections on
the pbilosopber G .E. Moore' s Principia Ethica (Skidelsky, 198 3) - was
quite different from that of other Cambridge economists. Accordingly,
although Keynes repeated the Cambridge view that economics is 'essentially a moral science and nota natural science' (CW, XIV, p. 297),
that bis own understanding of this notion and the method of economics
bad its origins in Keynes's own distinctive philosophical development
perhaps suggests that Keynes transformed the Cambridge understanding
of economic method, much as he transformed its conception of the
economy.
lndeed, the methodological thinking of the Cambridge school did
undergo considerable change in the space of three generations. At the
end of the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall, and
John Neville Keynes, while hesitant to say economics sought universal
laws on the model of natural science, nonetheless agreed that the
empirical generalization of well established facts was a meaningful
enterprise. Moreo ver, while each was aware of the role of val ue judgements
in economics, there were few doubts conceming the validity of the
normative-positive distinction, sin ce Nassau Senior bad cometo underlie
the idea of economics asan objective intellectual enterprise (Hutchison,
1981, pp. 46-62). By contrast, by the mid-twentieth century, it could
well be said that many at Cambridge, in the words .of Joan Robinson,
bel ieved that 'the positive and norma ti ve [could not] be sharply divided'
(Robinson, 1962, p. 74), and that empirical work in economics was
fraugbt with sucb difficulty that it could hardly be granted the role hoped
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for it at the beginning of the century. Jobn Maynard Keynes, then, in
virtue of bis ties to both the earlier and later Cambridge economists,
might naturally be thought the pivota! figure in this development.
Yet that Keynes's early philosophical thinking was largely formed
under the impact of a reading of Moore 's Principia, ratber than in a
conscientious study of the methodological convictions of the first generation of Cambridge economists, al so suggests that Keynes 's impact on
the development of Cambridge methodological thinking may well have
been relatively slight, given the fact that most economists at Cambridge
after Keynes were either unacquainted witb Moore's thought or simply
uninterested in it. From this perspective, it might well be surmised that
Keynes' s considerable prestige, combined witb his often severe criticism
ofhis predecessors, discouraged interest in earliermethodological views,
while, because Keynes' s own early intellectual development was highly
specific to a relatively prívate early philosophical experience, those
attracted to Keynes's economic theories found it difficult to understand,
or indeed feel mucb sympathy toward, those philosophical notions that
ultimately carne to underlie bis view of economics as a moral science. In
effect, later Cambridge economists had to innovate methodologically on
a rather narrow doctrinal base, portions of which were likely to be
altogether unappealing; and this, it could be concluded, makes a case for
metbodological discontinuity rather tban development in the thinking
about economics in tbe Cambridge scbool.
Moore, it is interesting to note, was a stugent of Sidgwick's in ethics
at tbe turn ofthe century, and thus might líáve reinforced the SidgwickMarshall-Neville Keynes tradition in metbodological thinking for J.M.
Keynes. However, Sidgwick, whose seven-edition The Methods ofEthics
was meant. to synthesize the competing nineteenth-century moral philosophy traditions of J.S. Mill's utilitarianism and William Whewell's
intuitionism (mucb as Marshall's authoritative Principies was meant to
do for economics), never persuaded Moore that utilitarianism was coherent. As a result, Moore was to go on to revive the longstanding
Cambridge Platonist tradition in bis intuitionist Principia, and this set of
ideas accordingly became the basis for Keynes 's own early pbilosophical
views. Indeed, Keynes's first major work, his Treatise on Probability,
acknowledged (CW, VII, p. 20) and drew heavily on these Moorean
beginnings (see O 'Donnell, 1989a). In effect, then, Keynes' s early philosophical thinking reached ba{;k in time over the first generation of
Cambridge economists to a prior intellectual tradition at Cambridge.
While this is arguably the reason Keynes' s thinking about economic
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method has rarely been well explained, at the same time such beginnings
provide new opportunities and resources for explaining Keynes' s methodological thinking. What, then, were Keynes' s early philosophical
positions as they might relate to Keynes' s later understanding of economic method?

KEYNES AND INDIVIDUAL JUDGEMENT
Keynes 's 1938 characterization of economics as a moral science depends
centrally upon conceiving economics as an art. In believing economics
as art, however, one gives up the customary, natural science view of
scientific method whereby one assumes individual instances are assimilated under general principies in relatively unproblematic fashion, and
in its place rests greater emphasis upon the economist' s capacity to
exercise individual judgement regarding the novelty of the particular
instance and the significance of data generally. Keynes suggests this in
his 1938 statement in asserting that economics is 'a branch of logic, a
way ofthinking' (CW, XIV, p. 297), and by emphasizing his conception
ofwhat was involved in working with models of economic relationships.
On this view, 'it is the essence of a model that one does not fill in real
values for the variable functions' since todo this was to deprive a model
of 'its generality and its value as a mode of thought' (Ibid.). Thus, an
economic model for Keynes possesses an important element of indeterminacy which demands a capacity for individual judgement.
These convictions recall Keynes' s earlier interest in individualjudgement in his first reftections upon Moore's Principia. In his unpublished
1904 'Ethics in Relation to Conduct' paper, Keynes noted that Moore's
recommendation to follow general cornmonsense rules of conduct when
estimating the probable remo te future effects of one' s actions was often
-of little value when past experience bore little relation to the future.
Indeed, Keynes went on to argue, probability statements ought not to be
understood as simply registering what has occurred in sorne given
proportion of past cases - in effect, the frequency theory of probability
- but rather should be thought to represent one' s estímate of the
justification needed to make sorne statement, given the evidence at one' s
disposal. This implies that, even when one possesses sorne record ofpast
experience regarding the likelihood of a future event, that evidence must
nonetheless still be evaluated for its bearing on the conclusion at hand.
Individual judgement accordingly took on particular significance for
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Keynes from the outset of bis intellectual career, so that, unlike others in
the early Cambridge methodological tradition, Keynes always evidenced
a considerable scepticism toward the use of a posteriori general principies in economics.
Keynes, bowever, was by no means of the opinion that legitimate
general principies were non-existent. When, after sorne de lay, he finally
published bis first and only pbilosopbical study, the Treatise on Probability, Keynes asserted that probability relationsbips concemed 'a
logical relation between two sets ofpropositions' (CW, VII, p. 9), and
that 'logic investigates the general principies ofvalid thought' ( CW, VII,
p. 3). What Keynes principally inherited from Moore, in fact, was the
view that one could intuit, or grasp, in an act of individual judgement,
general a priori relationsbips. This bad been the central doctrine of
Principia Ethica, where Moore bad advanced the view that the good was
sui generis and could only be grasped in and of itself. It was also the key
position in Keynes's Treatise, wbere Keynes asserted that it was not
possible to define probability, and tbat our knowledge of probability
relationsbips depends upon our 'direct acquaintance' with logical relations between propositions (CW, VII, p. 13).
At the same time, in Keynes' s mind this 'direct acquaintance' with the
logical relationships between propositions retained an important connection with individual judgement. In arguing that probability relationsbips were objective and logical, Keynes had asserted that propositions
were not probable in and of themselves, but rather only probable in
relation toa particular body of knowledge ~bodied in otber propositions. This implied, he noted, that probability theory possesses both
subjective and objective dimensions, since
... [W]hat particular propositions we selectas the premisses of our argument
naturally depends on subjective factors peculiar to ourselves, [while] the
relations, in which other propositions stand to these, and which entitle us to
probable beliefs, are objective and logical (CW, VII, p. 4).

One's 'direct acquaintance' with the logical relations between propositions, then, depends importantly upon one's judgement concerning the
evidence relevant to the desired probability judgement, since were our
'premisses' to cbange, we would generally discover ourselves directly
acquainted with altogether different probability relationships. Keynes,
in fact, took this to be a particular strength of his account.
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Reftection will show that this account harmonises with familiar experience.
There is nothing novel in the supposition that the probability of a theory tums
upon the evidence by which it is supported; and it is common to assert that
an opinion was probable on the evidence first at hand, but on further
information was untenable. As our knowledge or our hypothesis changes,
our conclusions have new probabilities, not in themselves, but relatively to
these new premises (CW, VII, p. 8).

Thus, although the knowledge of probability relationships is a knowledge of general a priori logical principies, for Keynes this knowledge
depends significantly u pon the exercise of individual judgernent.
All of this, Keynes went on to allow, irnposes a certain relativity on
probable knowledge that rnany rnightwell surmise undermines the objective
character of that know ledge.
Sorne part of knowledge- knowledge of our own existence or of our own
sensations- is clearly relative to individual experience. We cannot speak of
knowledge absolutely- only of the knowledge of a particular person. Other
parts of knowledge- know ledge of the axioms of logic, for example -m ay
seem more objective. But we must admit, 1 think, that this too is relative to
the constitution of the human mind, and that the constitution of the human
mind may vary in sorne degree from manto man. What is self-evident tome
and what 1 really know, may be only a probable beliefto you, or rnay form
no part of your rational beliefs at all. And this rnay be true not only of such
things as my existence, but of sorne logical axiorns al so. Sorne rnen- indeed
it is obviously the case- rnay have a greater power of logical intuition than
others (CW, VII, p. 14).

Keynes hirnself, of course, had little doubt that probability relationships
were indeed objective. Yet whether this is the case, or whether Keynes
was justified in thinking probability relationships objective, is not at
issue here. Rather what is irnportant to establish in the present context is
whether there is a connection between this early ernphasis Keynes places
on individual judgernent and what Keynes later understands about the
need for individual judgernent in econornic rnodels.
Certainly there is sorne question regarding whether or not Keynes's
early philosophical thinking in this regard underlies his later thinking
about econornic rnethod. In a later rnemoir, 'M y Early Beliefs', Keynes
repudiated sorne of his earliest philosophical thinking, especially in
regard to his early expressions of confidence conceming the unirnportance
of relying on rules in judging what was right or wrong to do ( CW, X, p.
446). Yet, although this rnight well seem to irnply that less ernphasis
should be placed on the role of individual judgement in Keynes's later
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methodological thinking, or that individual judgement has an altogether
different meaning for Keynes in his later work, the fact that in the same
year (1938) as bis 'My Early Beliefs' memo ir Keynes also emphasized
the importance of economists' capacity for individual judgement in his
moral science characterization ofeconomics suggests thathis 'M y Early
Beliefs' critique was only concerned with the need to reassess the role of
individualjudgement in ethics proper. What is there then in what Keynes
believes, distinctive of economics as a moral science that might be
explained by Keynes's earlier philosophical ideas?

KEYNES ON INTROSPECTION AND WDGEMENTS
OFVALUE
In bis 1938 characterization of economics as a moral science Keynes had
also noted that economists make important use of introspection and
judgements of value in their elaboration of economic models.
1 also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral
science. 1 mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with val ues.
1 might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological
uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material
as constant and homogeneous (CW, XIV, p. 300).

Economics is a moral science, then, because it is principally concemed
with individuals' 'motives, expectations, [and] psychological uncertainties'. This explains why its subject matter is neither 'constant' nor
'homogeneous' and why the methods of natural science are inappropriate
in economics. In effect, individuals' observed behaviour corre lates in
varying degree with their inner thoughts and iqtentions, so that economists must make significant use of introspectióiÍand judgements of val ue
to be able to model individuals' behaviour. Introspection would enable
the economist to ascribe motives to individuals, given their observed
behaviour; and judgements of value would enable the economist to
weigh the strength of individuals' commitments to various courses of
action they have undertaken. Indeed, by consulting one's own case the
economist could be expected to be able to 'segregat~ the semi-permanent
or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory or ftuctuating'
(CW, XIV, pp. 296-7), since one would presumably have a clearer sense
of an individual's motives by examining one's own likely motives in
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similar circumstances than by examining that individual' s observed
behaviour.
This perspective on ·economic method, as is well known, was not
original to Keynes. The earlier Cambridge tradition ofSidgwick, Marshall
and Neville Keynes had also emphasized introspection and judgements
of value in economic method, although not much attention was devoted
to examining the assumptions inherent in so doing. 2 Maynard Keynes,
however, had good reason to think more carefully about the presuppositions of employing these methods, since introspection and judgements
of value necessarily involve the exercise of individual judgement. That
is, were one to assess another's motives by comparison with one's own
case, this would clearly involve consulting one's own particularreaction
to the particular circumstances encountered by another. Although reasoning by analogy in this manner certainl y presupposes sorne know ledge
of general relationships between individuals and their circumstances,
the idea of case-by-case comparisons is nonetheless one that fundamentally concems individual judgement.
Of course, there is much that is obscure in the idea of describing
another's thoughts and intentions on the basis of one's own, and consequently whether it makes sense to say one can consult one' s own case in
order to evaluate that of others is not easily answered. On the one hand,
if we are entirely unique and distinct individuals, then our individual
circumstances will not be comparable. 3 On the other hand, if we do not
differ significantly in our personal motives and valuations, then our
behaviour should be sufficiently similar and transparent that it could well
be treated as 'constant and homogeneous'. Keynes, of course, rejected
this latter alternative. Indeed, his resistance toa natural science conception
of economics stemmed precisely from his conviction that individuals
were insufficiently similar in experience and circumstance for their
thoughts and intentions to be predicted solely on the basis of their
observable behaviour. How, then, was he able to argue that individuals
were unique and distinct, and that at the same time introspective
individual judgement was meaningful? Here, attention to Keynes's
early philosophical thinking is again valuable.
Shortly after bis first critique of Moore 's Principia Ethica in his 1904
'Ethics in Relation to Conduct', Keynes completed two additional
papers on the Principia for presentation to the Apostles, 'Miscellanea
Ethica', dated July-September 1905 and 'A Theory of Beauty ', dated
September-October 1905. Although the papers investigate a number of
difficulties in Moore's reasoning, for our purposes here, Keynes's con-
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clusions regarding the proper application ofMoore' s principie of organic
unities is of particular interest. Moore' s principie of organic unities
concemed the philosophical relationship between the value of a whole
and the value of its parts, and stated that the value of 'a whole bears no
regularproportion to the sum ofthe values of its parts' (Moore, 1903, p.
27). On the basis of this, Moore had gone on to argue that the universe
as a whole constitutes an organic unity, and that it was accordingly one 's
moral duty to promote the good of the universe itself. Keynes found this
conclusion unrealistic on the grounds that it made nonsense of the idea
of moral duty. He then reasoned that the universe is not the organic whole
whose value is at issue in ethics, and that this indicated that, where value
is concemed, the principie of organic unities is only properly applied to
the individual mind.
In ethical calculation each individual 's momentary state of mind is our sole
unit. In so far as a state ofmind has parts, to this extent I admit the principie
of organic unities: it is the excellence of the state as a whole with which we
are concemed. But beyond each individual the organic principie cannot
reach. 4

That is, the individual mind alone can be said to constitute an organic
unity and, accordingly, moral duty only concemed promoting good
states of mind in individuals.
The implications ofKeynes 's position, however, go beyond questions .
of ethics. That the individual mind is an organic unity implies both that
its activity can only be explained in terms of principies appropriate to it
as a whole and that the mind's parts - an individual's thoughts and
feelings- are themselves principally to be explained in terms of the
activity of the individual mind as a whole. Moreover, that for Keynes
every individual mind constitutes an organic unity in and of itself, and
that organic connection does not apply acros~Jndividual minds implies
that the principies that govem relationships between individual minds
are different in nature from those appropriate to the individual mind. In
effect, then, Keynes's redirection and reapplication of Moore's principies of organic unities effectively establishes a principie of autonomy for
the individual as well as the foundations for an account of the nature of
relationships between individuals. Individuals are distinct by virtue of
the personal integrity of their mental experience, although, in a manner
still to be explained, they share this autonomy with one another.
More formally, Keynes's redirection of Moore's organic unities
principie provided Keynes with rudimentary criteria for individuating
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the individual economic agent via the determination ofthe conditions for
individual identity through change. Generally speaking, one can claim
one has successfully distinguished an individual of any sort when one
can trace a set of characteristics that identify that individual through a
period of change in other characteristics of that individual. Keynes 's
ascriptio~ of an organic unity to the mental contents of an individual
accomplishes this since, though an individual's particular thoughts and
feelings certainly change, for Keynes, because the individual mind always
constitutes an organic unity and an individual' s thoughts identify that
individual, this implies that an individual' s new thoughts and feelings
remain the thoughts and feelings of that same individual.
This is of no little import. Although individuals are conventionally
taken to be different and distinct from one another (often by virtue of
their physical distinctiveness ), whether one can in fact justify this distinctiveness is crucial to any methodological strategy that depends upon
assessing the thinking and motives of others. Indeed, possessing criteria
for individual identity is indispensable to any coherent explanation of
introspection andjudgements ofvalue, since these methods presuppose
sorne degree of intellectual autonomy on the part of the individual having
recourse to them, in order to justify the claim that individuals can treat
their own cases as a source of independent information regarding the
motives and intentions underlying the observed behaviour of others. Put
simply, the elaboration of individual identity criteria is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for employing the methods of introspection and judgements of value. Such criteria are not sufficient in themselves, however, because establishing the distinctiveness of an individual' s thought process does not al so establish the representativeness of
that thought process. That is, introspection and judgements of value can
only be said to be authoritative if the thinking of the individual making
such judgements can be said to be both distinct from and representative
of the thinking of those individuals in economic life whose behaviour is
to be explained. Does Keynes, then, also have a conception of the
representative individual that would permit the economist taking his or
her imagined responses to a set of circumstances confronted by others as
typical of those individuals' likely responses to those circumstances?
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KEYNES AND 'THE APPROXIMATE UNIFORMITY
. OF HUMAN ORGANS'
From quite early in his intellectual career Keynes did indeed struggle to
define a sense in which an individual's thinking could be said to be
typical of the thinking of individuals generally. Although, arguably,
Keynes felt sorne difficulty in establishing this latter dimension ofhuman
thought (see Davis, 1991), nonetheless he clearly believed that an individual' s thinking could be explained both in terms of a capacity for
individual judgement reftecting u pon that individual' s own particular
experience and a capacity to reason in a manner that might be said
objective in an intersubjective sense. This is apparent in Keynes 's 1905
'Miscellanea Ethica' paper, where Keynes draws a distinction between
what an individual can think and feel and what an individual ought to
think and feel.
[l]t is plain that the idea and the emotion appropriate to any given sensation
are partly dependent on the nature aild past history of the individual who
feels. This is obvious enough; we ought not all to have precisely similar
states in similar physical circumstances; common sense and the
commandments are agreed on that. But we can in many cases abstract that
element which ought to vary from man to man. Assuming the approximate
uniformity of human organs, we can often - say what, apart from peculiar
circumstances, aman ought to think and feel:- not indeed what he can think
and feel- that will always depend upon his nature and his past.

Thus Keynes allows a role for individual judgement, but also supposes
that one can often say what another individual would likely think and
feel, on the grounds that there exists an 'approximate uniformity of
human organs '. Since individuals possess essentially the same constitution, it is not unreasonable to say that we often anticipate what another
will think and do under normal circumstance-&,_although this does not of
course preclude unexpected behaviour on the part of individuals, since
an individual' s behaviour is also to be explained by his or her 'nature and
past history'. But economics surely is concerned with explaining average
behaviour and thus, on Keynes' s view, the economist would not be
unjustified in supposing introspection and judgements of value produce
defensible opinions about agents' motives and intentions.
This notion of a common intellectual and motivational constitution,
it should be noted, has already been seen to underlie Keynes's thinking
in his Treatise on Probability. There Keynes asserts that 'logic investí-
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gates the general principies of valid thought' which form the basis for
rational belief. While probability judgements do possess a subjective
dimension in the mdividual's selection of premises, this should not
obscure the objective character of probability in Keynes 's view.
But in the sense important to logic, probability is not su bjective. It is not, that
is to say, subject to human caprice. A proposition is not probable because we
think it so. When once the facts are given which determine our knowledge,
what is probable or improbable in the circumstances has been fixed objectively,
and is independent of our opinion. The theory of probability is logical,
therefore, because it is concerned with the degree of belief which it is
rational to entertain in given conditions, and not merely with the actual
beliefs ofparticularindividuals, which may ormay not be rational ( CW, VIII,
p. 4).

Keynes 's position in this regard, it is true, is not invulnerable to the
considerable emphasis Keynes also placed on individual judgement in
the Treatise, especially inhis above noted discussion of 'the relativity of
knowledge to the individual' (VIll, p. 18). Yet at the same time, Keynes
obviously saw two dimensions to an individual' s thinking - subjective
and objective sides- and this conviction is what is at issue in an analysis
of bis claims for economics as a moral science.
lndeed, when Keynes carne to confront F .P. Ramsey 's criticism of the
Treatise on Probability as indefensibly objectivist, Keynes allowed that
there was something to Ramsey's complaint, while still insisting that
Ramsey 's account of probabilities as subjective was nonetheless lacking
in an important regard.
Ramsey argues, as against the view which 1 put forward, that probability is
concerned not with objective relations between propositions but (i•i sorne
sense) with degrees ofbelief, and he succeeds in showing that the calculus
of probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for ensuring that the system
of degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent system. Thus the
calculus of probabilities belongs to formallogic. But the basis of our degrees
of belief- or the a priori probabilities, as they u sed to be called- is part of
our human outfit, perhaps given to us merely by natural selection, analogous
to our perceptions and our memories rather than to formallogic ( CW, X, pp.

338-9).

Thus, although it may not be possible to speak of objective probability
relations between propositions in the manner desired in the Treatise, for
Keynes e ven Ramsey 's view should not be regarded as a full y subjective
one, since it still presupposes 'our human outfit' is somehow responsible
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for the rules that define the calculus of probabilities. How 'our human
outfit' might function to produce a coherent, intersubjective calculus of
probabilities, admittedly, is not explained by Keynes. It is clear, nonetheless, that despite the considerable weight Keynes placed on individual
judgement in bis philosophical thinking, this somehow always operated
against a backdrop of intersubjective intellectual capacity among individuals.
This emphasis should be placed in proper perspective. When Keynes
argued in 1938 that economics is a moral science, he specifically contrasted bis view to that of Lionel Robbins, who Keynes characterized as
supporting the view that economics is a natural science (CW, XIV, p.
297). Robbins, of course, is especially well known for bis An Essay on
the Nature and Signijicance of Economic Science argument that ínterpersonal comparisons of utility are inappropriate in economics if economics is to be regarded as a science (1935; 1938). For Robbins, ínterpersonal utility comparisons essentially depend u pon value judgements,
and value judgements, in contrast to judgements of a factual nature, are
not verifiable and thus not scientific (1935, pp. 148-9). Robbins's
critique had a dramatic impact on economists when it appeared, since it
created significant doubts among economists concerning the legitimacy
of redistributive social welfare policies, which had been standard in
economics since Marshall. lndeed, Robbins's argument was an important stimulus to Ro y Harrod' s Presidential Address to Section F of the
British Association, 'S cope and Method of Economics ', which was
published in the September 1938 Economic Journal. Keynes's own re- ·
marks about Robbins and economics carne in correspondence with
Harrod prior to the latter's August presentation of the Address. Robbins
also responded to Harrod in a December 1938 Economic Journal comment.
Accordingly, that Keynes argued that economics is a moral science,
and that it justifiably employs introspection aQd Judgements of value (or
value judgements), should be taken to stand in direct opposition to
Robbins's position. In claiming one can consult one's own imagined
reaction to given circumstances, and then analogically assess the motives
and intentions of economic agents whose behaviour is to be explained,
Keynes confronts essentially the same issues that Robbins addressed in
arguing against interpersonal utility comparisons. Moreover, it might
well be said that the focus of the issue for Keynes- as clearly it is for
Robbins- is whether it is methodologically reasonable to make value
judgements in economics, since Keynes allows that introspection also
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involves judgements ofvalue, when one assessesthe strengtb or force of
a presumed motive ascribed toa given economic agent analogicall y from
one 's own case. How, then, might Keynes bave justified bis proposed
reliance on judgements of value (or value judgements) in ligbt of
Robbins 's assertion that sucb judgements cannot be scientific?
First, Keynes, from the time of bis 1904 'Ethics in Relation to
Conduct' critique of Moore 's reliance on the frequency theory of probability, clearly believed that the evidence potentially favourable to a
given proposition always requires interpretation. This implies that
individual judgement is indispensable to empirical argument, and also
tbat judgements of value are involved in an investigator' s assessment of
the quality and significance of evidence at band. On tbis view, Robbins' s
model of an a posteriori verification of empirical propositions - where
the facts effectively speak for themselves - misrepresents scientific
practice, since empirical verification lacks the exceptional standing
claimed for it and does not offer a clear metbodological altemative to
using judgements of value. Second, bowever, Keynes unlike Robbins,
believed tbat judgements of value could be reasonably objective, and
that this provided positive justification for their (selective) use in
economics. Keynes early on argued, in bis 'Miscellanea Ethica' paper,
tbat a reapplication of Moore' s organic unities principie made it possible
to ground moral judgements more securely than Moore bad done in his
Principia Ethica, and tbus that moral judgements could generally be
thougbt objective. This conclusion was supported by Keynes 's distinction
between wbat one actually thinks and feels and wbat one ougbt to tbink
and feel. Althougb certainly it is not always straightforward bow these
are distinguished, nonetheless in Keynes's view there is a difference
between them. In contrast, it is fair to say tbat from Robbins's point of
view ,judgements ofvalue are invariably associated with wbat individuals
bappen to think and feel, since there is no agreed-upon manner- no
method of verification- in which one can say how one ougbt to think and
feel.
·
Indeed, it is tbe willingness or unwillingness to claim that a genuine
difference exists between what one actually thinks and feels and what
one ougbt to think and feel that separates the respective positions of
Robbins and Keynes on the use of introspection as a metbodological
strategy in economics. Robbins, in bis critique of interpersonal utility
comparisons, argued tbat there was no means oftesting the magnitude of
one individual' s satisfaction derived from a given income as compared
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with that of another, and that the effort todo this inevitably necessitated
value judgements.
Introspection does not enable Ato measure what is going on in B' s mind, nor
B to measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the
satisfaction of different people (Robbins, 1935, p. 139).

Keynes, however, did not associate scientificity exclusively with verification through measurement, and thus did not regard the lack of measurability and the attendent recourse to value judgement in introspection
as an indication of non-objective judgement. 5 In part, he believed this
because he believed value judgements could be objective in the sense of
it being possible to say what an individual ought to think and feel in given
circumstances, so that it was not necessary for example, as Robbins
thought, to say that one could never compare two individuals' satisfaction
with a given income.
As a methodological approach, accordingly, introspection depends
upon defending the possibility of there being certain kinds of value
judgements - namely, those that are obje.ctive in the sense of being
intersubjectively defensible. To be able to consult one' s own ímagined
reaction to circumstances experienced by others, and treat this projected
response as informative about others' motives and intentions, one must
be able to say with confidence that, since individuals ought generally to
be expected to respond to such circumstances in certain ways, one 's own
projected response in a situation can be thought representative of those
of others. This is, as noted above in connection with Keynes' s discussioil
of 'the approximate uniformity of human organs', a matter of having
sorne methodological foundation for explaining the intersubjective side
ofhumanjudgement to accompany bis attention to individualjudgement.
Both, it was argued, are necessary toan account of the representative
individual employed in introspective analogical reasoning, since the
individual consulting bis o·r her own case must be both distinct and
typical of those whose behaviour is observe(( Robbins, unlike Keynes,
was reluctant to attribute 'an approximate uniformity ofhuman organs'
to individuals, and thus a capacity in judgement to individuals whereby
economists' introspective judgements of others' thoughts and feelings
could be thought legitimate. In effect, Robbins, saw but one dimension
to human nature - namely, that especially subjective side that Keynes
associated with the capacity for a distinctively individual judgement, and
which is today associated with the complete exogeneity of taste.
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CONCLUSION
Keynes's moral science view of economics has received little attention,
no doubt due in part to the inaccessibility of its philosophical foundations, but also undeniably to the modem trend in methodological thinking
that treats economics as what Keynes termed for Robbins a natural
science. Keynes' s understanding, however, is provocative, in that it
links this methodological conception to fundamental questions conceming
the theory of the individual in economics. That is, since Keynes's
implicit defence of introspection and judgements of value is rooted in a
dual nature theory ofthe individual, the questionnaturally arises whether
a justifiable commitment to this methodological approach entails a
revision of economists' theory of the individual economic agent. In the
discussion here, it should be emphasized, the plausibility of the more
controversia! component ofKeynes 's view- 'the approximate uniformity
of human organs' - has not been assessed. Nor, moreover, has the
relationship between individual judgement and an intersubjectively
objective human judgement been explored in a manner that provides
much more than an introduction to the idea of the representative
individual. These further investigations, nonetheless, are arguably central
to an understanding of not just Keynes 's methodological views, but,
more importantly, to an understanding of his theoretical strategies
conceming the independent variables, 'in the first instance', of The
General Theory- the propensity to consume, the marginal efficiency of
capital schedule and the rate of interest (VII, p. 245). Accordingly,
further investigation of these questions must necessarily take as its
reference point the logic of the theory of the individual.

NOTES
l.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Pennission to quote from unpublished manuscripts in the J.M. Keynes Papers in
King's College Library was kindly granted by King's College, Cambridge University. Unpublished writings of J.M. Keynes © The Provost and Scholars of
King's College, Cambridge, 1991.
Compare, forexample, J.N. Keynes's remarks aboutintrospection (1955, p. 173).
This seems to be Lionel Robbins's position, discussed below.
The two passages from Keynes's unpublished writings quoted in the text are from
'Miscellanea Ethica'.
For Keynes's views on measurement of probabilities, see O'Donnell (1989).

